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SEX OFFENDERS, CUSTODY AND HABEAS 
WENDY R. CALAWAY† 
INTRODUCTION 
The conventional rhetoric surrounding discussions of habeas 
corpus, as the great instrument for the protection of freedom, 
often ignores the realities of how access to habeas corpus is 
granted or, more importantly, denied.  The legislature has taken 
great efforts to limit state petitioners’ access to the federal 
courts.1  Generally, courts have enforced the procedural rules and 
regulations, making access to courts for state petitioners 
cumbersome and complicated;2 however, in at least one respect, 
the jurisdictional requirement of custody, courts have taken a 
more liberal view.   
To obtain federal habeas review of a petitioner’s state 
conviction, the petitioner must be in custody.3  The Supreme 
Court’s determination of the meaning of the custody requirement 
has revolved around restraints on liberty.4  Petitioners need not 
be physically confined to demonstrate custody, but must suffer 
significant restraints on their liberty.5  Using this paradigm, the 
Supreme Court has extended the definition of custody to those on 
parole, those on probation, and those out on bond awaiting trial.6  
Lower courts have extended this reasoning even further;7  
 
 
 
† Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Cincinnati Blue Ash, 
J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law.  Professor Calaway represented the 
petitioner in the case, Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2018), one of 
the latest cases from the circuit courts on the issue of whether a petitioner under a 
sex offender registration law is in custody for purposes of habeas review. 
1 Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, 
Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1103, 1111–12 (1999) (discussing legislative limitations on access to habeas relief). 
2 See generally Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas 
Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868 (1997). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
4 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239–40 (1963). 
5 Id. at 242–43. 
6 Id. 
7 E.g., Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(finding that 500 hours of community service performed by the petitioner constituted 
custody). 
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however, courts have failed to apply the custody requirement to 
sex offenders seeking habeas review in a coherent, realistic 
manner. 
Most courts have determined that once a person’s prison 
sentence has expired, she is no longer considered to be in custody 
for purposes of habeas review, even if she has to comply with sex 
offender requirements.8  Using a variety of standards and factors, 
courts have determined that the sex offender requirements are 
not significant restraints on physical liberty.9  In doing so, courts 
have failed to consider the particulars of the sex offender 
legislation compared to those of other jurisdictions and have 
failed to consider the data produced by social scientists on the 
implications of the sex offender designation.  The reality is that 
sex offenders from many states are burdened by restrictions and 
requirements far more onerous than individuals on probation or 
parole.  Further, like individuals on probation or parole, sex 
offenders are subject to severe criminal penalties for violation of 
the requirements.  Failure to acknowledge these realities leads to 
a result that is required by neither Supreme Court precedent nor 
by the habeas statute. 
This Article focuses on habeas petitioners under a conviction 
from state court seeking federal habeas review.  First, Part I will 
discuss the historical context of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
development of its purpose and scope.  Part I also examines the 
current status of habeas corpus law, recent legislative efforts to 
limit its reach, and, specifically, the idea of custody as a 
prerequisite to habeas relief.  Part II explores the evolution of the 
custody requirement both at the Supreme Court and in lower 
federal courts.  In particular, this section looks at how the 
meaning of custody has evolved over time from physical custody 
to more intangible restrictions on liberty.  Part III addresses the 
application of custody jurisprudence to the issue of sex offenders.  
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, but 
several circuit courts have, and Part III addresses the 
implications of these decisions.  Part IV examines sex offender 
legislation by discussing the particulars of various state statutes 
and reviewing social science research regarding the effect of the 
legislative requirements.  Finally, Part V looks at the standard 
applied by courts when discussing sex offender designation as 
 
8 See, e.g., Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 1998). 
9 Id. 
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“custody.”  This Article argues that the standard has shifted and 
been analyzed inconsistently.  The conclusion contends that, 
consistent with Supreme Court and lower court precedent on the 
issue of custody, individuals in many states subject to sex 
offender laws suffer significant restraints on their liberty and, 
therefore, meet the jurisdictional requirement for habeas review. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Often considered “the most celebrated writ in the English 
law”10 and “[t]he most important human rights provision in the 
Constitution,”11 the writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries 
esteemed as the preeminent means by which people of a free 
society maintain their liberty.12  Chief Justice Salmon Chase 
characterized habeas as “the best and only sufficient defence of 
personal freedom.”13  The idea of habeas corpus traces its roots to 
England in the thirteenth century.14  At its most basic, habeas 
corpus provides a mechanism for a criminal defendant to be 
physically present before the court.15  The traditions in England 
connected habeas corpus not to concepts of liberty, but to a 
mechanism for having the defendant in court to answer for 
charges.16  The historical purpose and scope of the law of habeas 
corpus in England has been well documented elsewhere;17 
however, the development of habeas corpus in the United States 
has diverged from the historical underpinnings in England.  
Rather than using habeas corpus as a mechanism for securing a 
defendant’s appearance in court, the concept of habeas corpus in 
the United States has been used by defendants to secure their 
liberty.18  Habeas corpus is enshrined in the United States 
 
10 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130. 
11 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 
32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1952). 
12 Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996) (quoting Ex parte Yerger, 75 
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868)). 
13 Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 95. 
14 See, e.g., 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN A.D. 1200–1225, at 67 (n.p., Frederic 
W. Maitland ed., Selden Soc’y 1887); 8 CURIA REGIS ROLLS 308 (C.T. Flower ed., 
1938) (1219–1220). 
15 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 591–94 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d 
ed. 1898). 
16 ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 14, 20 (1960). 
17 See JUDITH FARBEY & R. J. SHARPE WITH SIMON ATRILL, THE LAW OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 1, 18 (3d ed. 2011). 
18 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–40 (2008). 
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Constitution as a mechanism of review for cases of illegal 
confinement;19 thus, habeas corpus became less of a tool to 
compel the behavior of defendants and more of an instrument for 
defendants to compel the action of the courts.  Through this shift 
habeas corpus became, in theory, the great protector of individual 
liberty. 
Article I, § 9 of the United States Constitution provides that 
“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”20  The writ’s purpose is to provide a 
mechanism for individuals to hold the government accountable 
for violations of the law.21  At first, the right to habeas corpus 
existed only for cases in which a federal petitioner was 
imprisoned22 or the jurisdiction of the court was challenged.23  
But, in 1867, Congress extended federal habeas corpus protection 
to prisoners held in state custody.24  The Supreme Court noted 
the breadth of habeas protection, finding that Congress extended 
habeas corpus jurisdiction to “every court and of every judge 
every possible case” of liberty deprivation.25  Historically, courts 
explicitly and tacitly acknowledged the importance of habeas 
corpus, expanding both the access and the scope of the writ.26 
 
19 See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1038, 1040 (1970); see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress 
over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in 
Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV.  1010, 1016–23 (1924). 
20 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
21 See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325–26 (1867). 
22 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477–78 (1991) (citing Ex parte Wells, 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 307, 307 (1855)). 
23 Id. (citing Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201–03 (1830)). 
24 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–55 (2012), partially invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723 (2008)). 
25 McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 325–26. 
26 See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 325–29 (1915); Ex parte Siebold, 
100 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1879) (explaining jurisdictional limitations where charges 
were based on a statute later found unconstitutional); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 163, 176–78 (1873); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term—
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 103–04 (1959) 
(detailing the “process of expansion of the concept of a lack of jurisdiction.”); see 
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.1, at 940–41, § 15.2, at 
947–52 (7th ed. 2016) (discussing the changes in constitutional interpretation that 
led to a new habeas law); Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great 
Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557, 564–566 (1994) (outlining the Supreme Court precedent 
that expanded the scope of habeas corpus relief). 
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However, reference to more recent congressional action and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has repeatedly imposed new 
procedural hurdles and restricted availability of habeas review.27  
The statute of limitations requires that petitioners file within one 
year of when the conviction becomes final in state court or when 
the time for seeking such review expires.28  Petitioners must 
exhaust all claims in state court before they are presented in a 
federal habeas petition.29  Exhaustion requires petitioners to 
provide the state’s highest court with an opportunity to review 
both the factual basis and the constitutional principle underlying 
the claim.30  When a claim has not first been presented in state 
court, it is procedurally defaulted and barred from review in 
federal court.31  Even when these procedural hurdles are cleared, 
the standard of review for habeas claims is narrow.  Federal 
habeas relief cannot be granted unless a petitioner demonstrates 
that the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law,” or “resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 
the evidence presented.”32  In addition to these statutory 
requirements, the availability of habeas relief is curtailed by the 
jurisdictional requirement that the petitioner be in custody at the 
time the petition is filed.33 
 
 
27 See, e.g., The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review: Federal Court Treatment of the New Habeas Provisions, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 1578, 1578 (1998); Margolis, supra note 26, at 574, 576–77; Frank J. 
Remington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on the 
Altars of Expediency, Federalism and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
339, 339–40 (1987–88); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362, 362–64 (1991); Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-
Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: 
Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 
325, 328; Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 9, 13–14, 32–33 (1990). Those convicted in both state court and 
federal court have the ability to seek habeas review, however, the procedural 
restrictions and requirements are different. This Article focuses on state habeas 
petitioners. 
28 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
29 Id. § 2254(b)(1). See also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006). 
30 Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (per curiam); Rose v. Lundy, 
455 U.S. 509, 514–15 (1982). 
31 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83–84 (1977). 
32 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
33 Id. § 2254(a). 
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Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state defendant 
who challenges the fact or duration of her confinement and seeks 
release.34  Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners to 
correct violations of the United States Constitution, federal laws, 
or treaties of the United States.35  To obtain relief under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the petitioner must be in custody.36  The 
term custody encompasses not only individuals subject to 
immediate physical imprisonment, but also those subject to 
restraints that significantly confine and restrain freedom and are 
not shared by the public generally.37  Each claim in a petition 
must satisfy the custody requirement.38  Courts determine 
whether a habeas corpus petitioner is in custody for purposes of 
§§ 2241 and 2254 at the time that the petition is filed.39  
“Although [the] petitioner’s release from custody subsequent to 
the filing of the complaint may render his case moot,” such a 
release does not impact the threshold question of custody.40 
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF CUSTODY 
The earliest interpretations of custody required that a 
petitioner be physically confined.41  The Court’s interpretation 
relied on the literal translation of habeas corpus, “you have the 
body,” and thus, it was necessary to have the body in order to 
release it.42  As time evolved, so did the Court’s interpretation of 
the custody requirement.  In Jones v. Cunningham, the Court 
held that the right to habeas corpus should not be constricted by 
this ritualistic formula.43  The Court was careful to specifically 
declare the importance of habeas corpus in protecting individuals 
 
34 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 
35 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
36 Id. 
37 See Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Children’s Serv. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 508–10 
(1982); see also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239–43 (1963). 
38  Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 2002); United States. v. Hatten, 167 F.3d 884, 
887 (5th Cir. 1999); Barnickel v. United States, 113 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997). 
39 See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 
262, 268 (6th Cir. 1984). 
40 Sevier, 742 F.2d at 268–69. 
41 Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1885). See 1 BRIAN R. MEANS, 
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 7:2 (2018 ed.), for a general discussion of the history 
and development of the custody requirement.  
42 CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE ix (2006). 
43 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
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against instrusions on their liberty.44  In this case, the Court 
determined a petitioner on parole satisfied the custody 
requirement.45  There, the petitioner was convicted and 
sentenced to ten years in prison because it was his third 
offense.46  He challenged his status as a third time offender, 
alleging that one of the three prior convictions was invalid.47  
While the case was pending, he was paroled and placed under the 
custody of the parole board with certain terms and conditions to 
follow.48  He was required to live at a certain address, to obtain 
permission before moving or leaving the jurisdiction, to allow the 
parole officer to visit his home or place of employment, and to 
follow the parole officer’s “instructions and advice.”49  He was 
subject to potential reincarceration for violation of the conditions 
of parole.50  The court of appeals dismissed the case as moot 
because the petitioner was no longer in custody;51 however, the 
Supreme Court overturned, finding that the conditions of parole 
significantly restricted the petitioner’s “liberty to do those things 
which in this country free men are entitled to do.”52 
Subsequent to Jones, the Court decided a series of cases 
addressing the timing of the custody requirement rather than the 
conditions that qualify as custody.53  For example, in Carafas v. 
LaVallee, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas relief while he 
was incarcerated, but his sentence expired while the petition was 
pending.54  The government relied on Parker v. Ellis in arguing 
that the expiration of the sentence invalidates federal 
 
44 Id. Historically speaking, the requirement that a petitioner be in custody for 
purposes of habeas relief has been one that the Court was willing to construe 
liberally.  Even when the Warren Court gave rise to the Rehnquist Court, and 
legislative access to habeas corpus relief became narrower, the Court generally made 
allowances in interpreting the meaning of custody. See Yale L. Rosenberg, The 
Federal Habeas Corpus Custody Decisions: Liberal Oasis or Conservative Prop?, 23 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 99, 101–02 (1995). 
45 Jones, 317 U.S. at 243. 
46 Id. at 237. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 242. 
51 Id. at 237–38. 
52 Id. at 243. 
53 See Garrett Ordower, Comment, Gone, but Not Forgotten? Habeas Corpus for 
Necessary Predicate Offenses, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1837, 1842–55 (2009) (discussing 
the evolution of the custody requirement). 
54 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). 
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jurisdiction.55  In Parker, the Supreme Court explicitly held that 
when a prisoner is released from prison, after serving his 
sentence, the federal habeas case is moot.56  In reassessing this 
holding in Carafas, the Court emphatically rejected the notion 
that the petitioner’s claims became moot.57  The Court noted that, 
consequent to the conviction, the petitioner could not engage in 
certain business, serve as an official of a labor union, vote in 
state elections, or serve as a juror.58  As a result of the 
“disabilities or burdens (which) may flow from [the] petitioner’s 
conviction, he has a substantial stake in the judgment of 
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence 
imposed on him.”59  The Court reversed the decision in Parker 
and determined that a petitioner satisfies the custody 
requirement if he is in custody at the time the petition is filed.60 
In Peyton v. Rowe, the Court also addressed the issue of 
custody as it relates to the timing of the petition.61  In this case, 
the petitioner was sentenced to serve thirty years for a rape 
conviction.62  He subsequently pled guilty to felonious abduction 
and was sentenced to serve a twenty-year sentence consecutive to 
the thirty-year sentence for the rape conviction.63  The petitioner 
filed a habeas petition challenging the felonious abduction 
conviction on double jeopardy grounds but did not challenge the 
rape conviction.64  Following Supreme Court precedent in 
McNally v. Hill,65 the district court dismissed the petition in 
Peyton, finding that the petitioner was not in custody because he 
 
55 Id. at 237. 
56 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 575 (1960), overruled by Carafas, 391 U.S. 234 
(1968). 
57 Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 
211, 222 (1946)). The Court’s discussion of these collateral consequences was 
provided to refute the argument that the petitioner’s claims were moot. The Court’s 
decision regarding custody seemed to hinge on when the petition was filed, meaning 
that at the time the petition was filed, he was in prison. Id. at 236–37. Because he 
was in custody at the time of filing, the Court retained jurisdiction even if he was 
later released. Id. at 237–38. 
60 See id. at 239–40. 
61 391 U.S. 54, 55 (1968). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 55–56. 
64 Id. at 56. 
65 293 U.S. 131, 133–36 (1934) (holding that a petitioner sentenced to serve a 
third conviction consecutive to the first two was not in custody for habeas review 
because he had not yet begun to serve the third prison term and was not challenging 
the convictions for counts one and two). 
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had not begun to serve the felonious abduction sentence he 
sought to challenge.66  Considering both judicial economy and 
practicality, the Court overruled McNally and held that “a 
prisoner serving consecutive sentences is ‘in custody’ [for] any 
one of them for purposes of” habeas relief.67 
In addition, the Court addressed the issue of where a 
petitioner must be located to meet the statutory requirement for 
custody.  The statute dictates that jurisdiction to review a habeas 
petition is limited to the petitioner and must be filed by persons 
physically present within the territorial limits of the district 
court.68  In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, the petitioner 
was imprisoned in Alabama at the time he filed the petition in 
the Western District of Kentucky.69  His habeas petition alleged a 
denial of his right to a speedy trial on a three-year-old case 
pending in Kentucky.70  Again relying on considerations of 
practicality—time, convenience, and expense—the Court rejected 
a “slavish” interpretation of § 2241(a).71  The Court held that the 
petitioner’s filing in the Western District of Kentucky did not 
deprive the court of jurisdiction.72  This case affirmed the Court’s 
approach to the custody requirement as liberal—not bound by a 
technical reading of the statute. 
Ten years after Jones, the Court again examined the 
substantive question of what it means to be in custody for 
purposes of habeas review.  In 1973, the Court reviewed a case 
 
66 Peyton, 391 U.S. at 56. 
67 Id. at 67. 
68 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012). 
69 410 U.S. 484, 485 (1973). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 499. 
72 Id. at 500. In making this determination, the Court declined to follow Ahrens 
v. Clark, which held that the court’s jurisdiction is confined to a petitioner who is 
confined in the jurisdiction where he seeks relief. Id. at 499–500; Ahrens v. Clark, 
335 U.S. 188, 192–93 (1948). The Court cited Peyton, Carafas, and Jones, noting:  
[C]ritical development since our decision in Ahrens is the emergence of new 
classes of prisoners who are able to petition for habeas corpus because of 
the adoption of a more expansive definition of the “custody” requirement of 
the habeas statute.  The overruling of McNally v. Hill  made it possible for 
prisoners in custody under one sentence to attack a sentence which they 
had not yet begun to serve. And it also enabled a petitioner held in one 
State to attack a detainer lodged against him by another State. In such a 
case, the State holding the prisoner in immediate confinement acts as 
agent for the demanding State, and the custodian State is presumably 
indifferent to the resolution of the prisoner’s attack on the detainer.  
Braden, 410 U.S. at 498–99 (italics added) (internal citations omitted). 
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where the defendant was out on a recognizance bond73 pending 
the imposition of a sentence after a conviction for a misdemeanor 
offense.74  After exhausting his state remedies, the petitioner 
sought relief from his conviction in federal district court.  The 
district court denied the petition and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
finding that release on his own recognizance pending execution of 
sentence was not custody for purposes of habeas review.75  In 
reversing this decision, the Supreme Court noted that a 
recognizance bond carried certain terms and conditions that 
restricted the freedom of the petitioner.76  Specifically, the Court 
noted that the petitioner was required to appear at all times and 
places required by the court and could be rearrested at any 
time.77  In finding that this qualifies as custody, the Court 
reasoned that the petitioner was “subject to restraints ‘not 
shared by the public generally.’ ”78  The Court went on to note 
that he could not move about as he pleased and that his freedom 
depended on the decisions of judicial officers.79  The Court went 
to some lengths to specifically limit the scope of the holding in 
Hensley v. Municipal Court, emphasizing that the decision did 
not extend to those on a recognizance bond awaiting trial;80 
however, this case did signal an expansion of the habeas doctrine 
well beyond that previously envisaged. 
In Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, the Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to examine just how far the Hensley 
decision would reach.81  The petitioner faced retrial on charges, 
which he alleged constituted double jeopardy.82  The petitioner 
was out on a recognizance bond while challenging the validity of 
 
73 The recognizance bond did not require the payment of money. The defendant 
was released on his promise to appear in court. Failure to appear for court hearings 
when directed could result in the revocation of the recognizance bond and the 
defendant’s incarceration pending the resolution of the case. 
74 Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 346–47 (1973). 
75 Id. at 345–46. 
76 Id. at 351–53. 
77 Id. at 351–52. 
78 Id. at 351 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 353. 
81 See 466 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1984). Both the district court and the First Circuit 
agreed that petitioner met the jurisdictional threshold and agreed that retrial was 
barred by double jeopardy. Id. at 299–300. The Supreme Court upheld the custody 
determination, however, reversing the circuit court’s determination that double 
jeopardy barred a retrial. Id. at 301, 303. 
82 Id. at 296–97. 
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a second trial in state and federal court.83  The state challenged 
the federal court’s jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition, 
alleging that the petitioner was not in custody.84  
Notwithstanding the Court’s limiting language in Hensley, the 
Lydon Court ruled that the petitioner’s status, on recognizance, 
awaiting retrial, satisfied the custody requirement.85  The Court 
analogized the petitioner’s circumstances to those of the 
petitioner in Hensley, finding that they were not identical, but 
not “sufficiently different to require a different result.”86  Quoting 
Hensley, the Lydon Court found that the petitioner satisfied the 
custody requirements because he was subject to “restraints not 
shared by the public generally.”87 
After expanding and refining the definition of “custody” for 
several years, in 1989 the Supreme Court pulled back in Maleng 
v. Cook.88  In Maleng, the Court addressed a situation where the 
petitioner was sentenced to serve a prison term, the length of 
which had been enhanced by a prior conviction.89  The petitioner 
attempted to attack the prior conviction in a federal habeas 
petition.  The issue the Court addressed was whether a habeas 
petitioner remains in custody under a conviction for which the 
sentence has expired because of the possibility that it may be 
used to enhance a sentence imposed for a future crime.90  The 
Court acknowledged that it had historically taken a liberal view 
of the custody requirement, but drew the line at sentences that 
had completely expired by the time the habeas petition was 
filed.91  The Court reasoned that it had “never extended [custody] 
to the situation where a habeas petitioner suffers no present 
restraint from a conviction.”92  The Court, however, was careful to 
contrast Maleng with Carafas. 
In Carafas, the Court noted that even though the petitioner’s 
conviction expired, he was still subject to collateral consequences 
as a result of his conviction: inability to vote; to serve on juries; 
 
83 Id. at 297–98. 
84 See id. at 300. 
85 Id. at 300–01. 
86 Id. at 301. 
87 Id. (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)). 
88 See 490 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1989) (per curiam). 
89 Id. at 489–90. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 492. 
92 Id. 
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and to engage in other business;93 however, the Court in Maleng 
specified that the custody decision in Carafas rested on timing of 
when the petition was filed, not on the collateral consequences 
suffered by the petitioner.94  In Carafas, the petitioner filed his 
petition before he was released from prison.95  In contrast, the 
petitioner in Maleng did not file his petition until the conviction 
had expired, so notwithstanding the collateral consequences of 
his conviction—including future sentencing enhancements—he 
did not meet the custody requirements.96  As will be discussed in 
detail below, it is the Court’s decision in Maleng, to the exclusion 
of the other Supreme Court precedent discussed here, that 
interpreting courts have used to deny relief to sex offenders 
seeking habeas review.97 
In Garlotte v. Fordice, the petitioner sought to thread a 
needle similar to the petitioner in Maleng, but reached a more 
favorable result.98  In this case, the petitioner challenged a 
marijuana conviction, which had expired at the time the habeas 
petition was filed.99  The petitioner was concerned the marijuana 
conviction would delay his parole eligibility on charges for which 
he was currently serving a prison sentence.100  Rather than 
adhering to Maleng, the Court relied on Peyton in finding that 
the petitioner satisfied the custody requirement.101  The Court 
cited Peyton and reaffirmed the commitment to the constitutional 
protections of habeas corpus review.102  The petitioner in Garlotte 
was serving consecutive sentences like the petitioner in Peyton.  
The distinguishing feature between these two cases was that, in 
Garlotte, the petitioner’s conviction had expired, and he was 
serving time on unrelated but consecutive sentences.  In contrast, 
the petitioner in Peyton challenged a conviction that he was going 
to serve in the future while he served time on unrelated, 
consecutive sentences.103  The Garlotte Court held that 
 
93 See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968). 
94 See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492–93. Again, the Court drew a distinction between 
whether a petitioner’s argument is moot and whether a petitioner is in custody for 
habeas purposes. 
95 Carafas, 391 U.S. at 236. 
96 Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490–91. 
97 See infra notes 243–61 and accompanying text. 
98 515 U.S. 39, 45–46 (1995). 
99 Id. at 42–43. 
100 Id. at 41. 
101 Id. at 45–46. 
102 Id. at 44. 
103 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 55–58 (1968). 
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consecutive sentences were viewed in the aggregate and that the 
petitioner was in custody.104  While this seems to be a departure 
from Maleng, leaving the door open for federal review of 
convictions that have fully expired, courts have not extended this 
analysis to those affected by sex offender statutory requirements. 
In summarizing what it means to be in custody for purposes 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, historically, both the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have taken a broad view.  Certainly, incarceration 
pursuant to the conviction or sentence challenged in the petition 
satisfies the custody requirement;105 however, incarceration is not 
required to establish custody, and courts have made the 
determination that the custody requirement is satisfied on far 
less serious infringements of a person’s liberty.106  As discussed 
above, a release on a personal recognizance bond without the 
obligation to post a financial surety, pending retrial, is 
considered custody because the restraints on the petitioner’s 
liberty were significant.107  The obligations imposed on the 
petitioner subjected him to “restraints ‘not shared by the public 
generally.’ ”108  Further, the petitioner is considered in custody 
when he is released on his own recognizance―between conviction 
and the imposition of sentence.109 
In addition to those awaiting trial or sentencing, those on 
probation or parole are also considered to be in custody.110  The 
custody requirement has been expanded to include those serving 
consecutive sentences, and habeas petitions may proceed when a 
petitioner is challenging a sentence scheduled to run first, even if 
 
104 Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 41. 
105 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 715–16 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even incarceration on convictions not 
being challenged in the instant petition can satisfy the custody requirement where 
the petitioner seeks to prevent a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. See Wilson v. 
Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 821–24 (9th Cir. 2009). 
106 Wilson, 554 F.3d at 822. 
107 Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1984). 
108 Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (quoting Jones v. 
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)). 
109 See id. at 349, 351. 
110 Jones, 371 U.S. at 241–43 (holding that parole satisfies the custody 
requirement); Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
probation and deferred probation orders satisfy the in custody requirement); 
Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[The petitioner] remains under 
supervised probation. Thus, he is still sufficiently ‘in custody’ to pursue federal 
habeas relief.” (citing Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1987))); Malinovsky 
v. Court of Common Pleas, 7 F.3d 1263, 1265 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Malinovsky is in 
custody, although he has been released on a personal recognizance bond.”). 
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it has already expired.111  Likewise, those who have been 
sentenced to community service112 or rehabilitation programs,113 
have faced deportation,114 or have suspended or stayed sentences 
are considered to be in custody.115  The Supreme Court has 
defined custody as a restriction imposed, which “significantly 
restrain[s] [a] petitioner’s liberty to do those things which in this 
country free men are entitled to do.”116  The following Parts will 
examine how this precedent is applied to those under sex 
offender laws. 
III. SEX OFFENDER LAWS AND CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 
Despite the expansive position taken with regard to the 
application of the custody requirement, courts have almost 
universally refused to extend the custody requirement to those 
under a sex offender registration.117  This trend started early in 
the circuit courts’ review of habeas petitions filed by sex 
offenders seeking review of their convictions in state court.  In 
Williamson v. Gregoire, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in 
a case involving restrictions imposed under Megan’s Law.118  The 
court determined that the obligations and restraints imposed by 
the sex offender designation amounted to collateral consequences 
of the conviction.119  The court focused analysis on the restraints 
on the petitioner’s liberty, noting that the statute at issue did not 
require in person registration, did not contain any prohibitions 
 
111 Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 46–47 (1995). 
112 Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 1997). 
113 Dow v. Circuit Court, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
114 Mustata v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022–23 (6th Cir. 1999). 
115 McVeigh v. Smith, 872 F.2d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Hensley v. 
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348–49 (1973)). 
116 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
117 Bonser v. Dist. Att’y Monroe Cty., 659 F. App’x 126, 128–29 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 692–94 (10th Cir. 2016); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. 
of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 
(4th Cir. 2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717–20 (7th Cir. 2008); Leslie v. 
Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521–24 (6th Cir. 2002); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 
(9th Cir. 2001); McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); 
Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Dickey v. 
Patton, No. Civ-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2015) 
(report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 
2015). But see Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 16-4175, 2019 WL 960003, at 
*6–7 (3rd Cir. Feb. 27, 2019). 
118 151 F.3d at 1182–84. Megan’s Law has generally been superseded by the 
Adam Walsh Act, discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 168–70 and 
accompanying text. 
119 Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184. 
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on where the petitioner was allowed to go, and did not impose 
obligations demanding his presence at any place at any time.120  
Under the Washington statute, “registration [could] be 
accomplished by mail.”121  In Williamson, the court thoroughly 
examined the sex offender statute and discussed the implications 
of its restrictions.122  Because the statute did not have any 
restrictions on where the petitioner could loiter, travel, live, or 
move, the court determined that it did not contain restraints on 
liberty significant enough to qualify as custody.123  As the 
following discussion will demonstrate, subsequent courts have 
relied on the reasoning of Williamson, without applying the 
custody standard to the particular statute at issue.  This has 
resulted in a body of jurisprudence that treats sex offender 
requirements as collateral consequences and as civil or remedial 
rather than punitive;124 however, as sex offender legislation has 
become more burdensome, restrictive, and punitive, the legal 
analysis has failed to keep pace. 
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this analytic 
trend.125  In Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, the petitioner, a high 
school teacher, was convicted in state court for having 
consensual, but unlawful, sexual contact with a student.126  She 
was sentenced to serve two years in prison and, as part of her 
sentence, was classified under Ohio’s sex offender statute as a 
Tier III sex offender.127  The petitioner served a portion of her 
prison sentence and was released on community control while 
her appeal was pending.128  She exhausted state remedies 
challenging her conviction and sentence and finally filed a 
petition for habeas relief in federal court.129  Prior to filing the 
habeas petition, the community control requirements were 
satisfied and discharged, but she still remained subject to the 
requirements of the Tier III sex offender designation.130  The 
 
120 Id. at 1183–84. 
121 Id. at 1184. 
122 Id. at 1181–82, 1184. 
123 Id. at 1183–84. 
124 See, e.g., Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014); 
Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 720 (7th Cir. 2008); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 
523 (6th Cir. 2002); McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
125 See Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 2018). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 739–40. 
130 Id. at 739. 
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respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the petitioner 
did not meet the jurisdictional requirements for habeas relief 
because she was not in custody as required by 29 U.S.C. § 2241.  
The petitioner argued that the sex offender designation 
requirements were custodial for purposes of the statute.131  On 
appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the petitioner argued that the sex 
offender designation posed significant restraints on her liberty.  
Previous iterations of sex offender legislation included 
registration requirements; however, new versions of sex offender 
designation schemes had been enacted in Ohio and elsewhere 
with far more burdensome requirements.132  Under the current 
Ohio statute, the petitioner was subject to the following 
restrictions:  She was prohibited from establishing a residence 
within 1,000 feet of a school, daycare or preschool; designated 
permanently as a sexual predator; mandated to register in 
person every ninety days, in each county where she worked, lived 
and went to school; required to divulge certain personal 
identifiers and information, which would be publicly disclosed; 
forced to disclose to the sheriff her address to verify housing 
information with the landlord; and prohibited from travelling 
outside the jurisdiction for more than three days without going to 
the sheriff in that county and registering.133  Further, these were 
lifetime requirements, which were part of the criminal sentence, 
imposed by the sentencing court.134  If the petitioner failed to 
comply, she was subject to a felony charge carrying a potential 
three-year prison sentence.135 
The petitioner argued that these restrictions constituted 
significant restraints on her liberty as contemplated in Jones v. 
Cunningham;136 however, the court determined that she had not 
demonstrated that Ohio’s residency restrictions amounted to 
governmental control over her movements.137  In rejecting the 
petitioner’s claim, the court distinguished between a parolee—
whose restrictions and punishment are based on his original 
 
131 Id. at 742–44. The petitioner urged the court to overrule its previous decision 
in Leslie v. Randle because the Ohio sex offender laws had changed since that 
decision. Id. She also argued that the new laws imposed more significant restraints 
on the freedoms of designees. Id. The district court dismissed the petition. Id. 
132 See Brief of Appellant at 9, Hautzenroeder, 887 F.3d 737 (No. 17-3395). 
133 Id. at 17–21. 
134 Id. at 21. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 22; Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1963). 
137 Hautzenroeder, 887 F.3d at 741. 
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conviction—and someone convicted under the Ohio sex offender 
laws—whose punishment would be based on a new offense.138  In 
doing so, the Sixth Circuit followed its prior decisions on this 
issue as well as other circuit courts on sex offender 
registration.139 
In Wilson v. Flaherty, a previous case with even more 
troubling implications, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue on 
facts involving claims of actual innocence.140  There, the 
petitioner was a part of the “Norfolk Four,” a group of four navy 
sailors convicted of the rape and the murder of another sailor’s 
wife.141  The court acquitted the petitioner of murder but 
convicted him of rape; he was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment and required to comply with the state’s sex 
offender laws.142  After completing his prison sentence, evidence 
came to light that called the validity of the petitioner’s conviction 
into serious question.143  Forensic evidence revealed another 
individual as the most likely perpetrator of the crimes.144  
Further, the post-conviction evidence suggested police 
misconduct significantly contributed to the petitioner’s wrongful 
conviction.145  By the time this evidence came to light, the 
petitioner had served his prison sentence but remained a 
designated sex offender, which involved lifetime obligations 
requiring him to regularly provide detailed personal information 
to the government and, among other things, limiting where he 
may live and travel.146  Finding that the sex offender registration 
requirements did not have a substantial impact on petitioner’s 
liberty, the Fourth Circuit found that the petitioner was not in  
 
 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 743–44 (citing Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (10th Cir. 
2016); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014); Wilson v. 
Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2012); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 523 (6th 
Cir. 2002); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 1999); Dickey v. 
Patton, No. Civ-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2015) 
(report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 
2015)).  
140 689 F.3d at 339. 
141 Id. at 333. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 334. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 333–35 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-903 to -904 (West 2018)). 
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custody, holding that “[t]o rule otherwise would drastically 
expand the writ of habeas corpus beyond its traditional purview 
and render [the] ‘in custody’ requirement meaningless.”147 
Dissenting, Judge Wynn noted concerns about the 
petitioner’s strong claims of actual innocence and disagreed with 
“the majority opinion’s contention that the deprivations on 
liberty incident to [the petitioner’s] sexual offender registration 
requirements [were] too trivial and too collateral to satisfy the 
requirement that a habeas petitioner be in custody.”148  In 
addition, he argued that the petitioner was “subject to a litany of 
in-person reporting requirements . . . that demand[ed] his 
presence at a particular place and particular time, and such 
obligations w[ould] extend the duration of [his] natural life.”149  
Although this decision drew wide criticism, the Supreme Court 
declined to hear the case.150 
In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit revisited the issue of 
custody and sex offenders in Dickey v. Allbaugh.151  In this case, 
the petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma of child sex abuse and 
sought review of his conviction in a federal habeas petition.152  
The petitioner argued that the restrictions imposed by 
Oklahoma’s statutory scheme were far more burdensome than 
those in Calhoun.153  For example, unlike the petitioner in 
Calhoun, the petitioner here was forbidden from working with 
children or at a school and was prohibited from living within 
2,000 feet of a school, playground, park, or child-care center.154  
Despite the significant differences in the statutory schemes in 
Calhoun and Dickey, the court cited its holding in Calhoun in 
denying dismissing the petition.155  The court found that the sex 
offender obligations and restrictions were “collateral 
 
147 Id. at 338. 
148 Id. at 344–45 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. at 346. 
150 See, e.g., J. Clay Douglas, The “Innocence and Redressability” Exception: A 
Fair Alternative to Habeas Jurisprudence's Direct Versus Collateral Consequence 
Dichotomy, 92 N.C. L. REV. 690, 709, 712, 716 (2014); Recent Case, Wilson v. 
Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 2105, 2105, 2109–10 
(2013). See also Wilson v. Flaherty, 570 U.S. 917 (2013). 
151 664 F. App’x 690, 691–92 (10th Cir. 2016). 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 692–93. See also Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 754 F.3d 1070, 1074 
(holding that the Colorado sex offender statutory requirements did not give rise to 
custody for habeas purposes); Brief of Appellant at 16, Dickey, 664 Fed. App’x 690 
(No. 15-6234). 
154 Brief of Appellant, supra note 153, at 16. 
155 Dickey, 664 F. App’x at 693–94. 
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consequences of [the] conviction and not a continuation of 
punishment.”156  In reaching this decision, the court found that 
the petitioner retained the same freedom of movement and 
association enjoyed by those not under the restrictions.157  As will 
be discussed below, these conclusions are patently at odds with 
the restrictions, obligations, and punishments regulating the 
conduct of sex offenders. 
The disconnect between the conclusions drawn by courts and 
the realities faced by the individuals laboring under sex offender 
restrictions was recognized by the Third Circuit in Piasecki v. 
Court of Common Pleas.158  There the court found that the 
majority of cases analyzing sex offender registration schemes did 
so under older versions of statutes that were less onerous than 
those at issue today.159  The sex offender requirements imposed 
under the statute in Pennsylvania included in person 
registration every ninety days and for other events, such as 
changing residences, beginning a new job or getting a new car.160  
The Pennsylvania statute also required preapproval for 
international travel.161  The sex offender designation was 
included as part of the sentence.162  The Piasecki court found that 
these restrictions were significant restraints on the petitioner’s 
liberty.163 
IV. EXAMINING THE LAW AND CONSEQUENCES OF  
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
Sex offender registration laws and regulations were 
originally enacted in an effort to reduce the prevalence of sexual 
crimes.164  Originally, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
 
156 Id. at 694. 
157 Id. at 693. 
158 No. 16-4175, 2019 WL 960003, at *11 (3rd Cir. Feb. 27, 2019). 
159 Id. at *7. 
160 Id. at *1–2. 
161 Id. at *2.  
162 Id. at *1. 
163 Id. at *8.  
164 Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual 
Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 413 (2010). These laws appear 
to have been adopted, at least in part, based on the idea that sex offenders recidivate 
at higher rates than other offenders. Id. This assumption has been called into 
question. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale 
of Criminal Laws that Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 57–58 (2010); 
Wayne A. Logan, Megan’s Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 371, 393–95 (2011) (explaining the factors that may account for the claim of 
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Children Act and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act 
were created to help law enforcement officials track sex offenders 
and decrease the likelihood that they would recidivate.165  Under 
these regulatory laws, convicted sex offenders were obligated to 
register and verify their current names and addresses with local 
police.166  Megan’s Law followed, amending the initial law and 
focusing on creating public access to registration information.167  
The Adam Walsh Act, enacted approximately eleven years later, 
made sweeping changes to registration, reporting, information 
collection requirements, and penalties.168  States were required to 
adopt certain portions of this federal law or risk losing access to 
certain federal funds.169  While sex offender registration laws 
have not been uniformly enacted, the requirements, restrictions, 
and penalties are on the books in all fifty states.170 
The federal Adam Walsh Act is an example of the kind of sex 
offender laws that have been enacted in other jurisdictions.  The 
Act requires classifying sex offenders by tier based on three 
offense levels: lower, moderate, and higher offenses.171  Offenders 
must register in all jurisdictions where they live, work, and 
attend school.172  These registrations must be verified, once a 
year for low-level offenders, twice a year for mid-level offenders 
and four times a year for high-level offenders.173  Failure to 
register is a felony offense that carries a potential prison 
sentence.174  The information that law enforcement collects 
 
higher recidivism rates); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic 
Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 382–83 (2005). 
165 Logan, supra note 164, at 377–78; see, e.g., Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,  
§ 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038–41 (1994), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, sec. 129, § (a), 120 Stat. 587 . 
166 Logan, supra note 164, at 373–74. 
167 Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, sec. 2, § 170101(d), 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). 
168 Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of 
Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1078 
(2011–2012). 
169 Id. at 1077. 
170 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003). The Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act sets minimum national standards for gathering, updating, and 
publicizing information about sex offenders. See 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 (West 2017); 
see also Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 434–36 (2012). 
171 34 U.S.C.A. § 20911; Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: 
How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 697, 702–03. 
172 Enniss, supra note 171, at 704; see also 34 U.S.C.A. § 20913(a). 
173 34 U.S.C.A. § 20918. 
174 See Enniss, supra note 171, at 702, 705; see also 34 U.S.C.A. § 20913(e). 
2018] SEX OFFENDERS, CUSTODY AND HABEAS 775 
includes the offenders’ criminal history, fingerprints, palm 
prints, and DNA.175  The registry is publically available on the 
Internet and communities are notified of an offender’s 
presence.176  Registration requirements remain in effect for 
fifteen years for low-level offenders, twenty-five years for mid-
level offenders, and life for high-level offenders.177  One of the 
more controversial aspects of the Adam Walsh Act is that it 
provides sex offender designations and requirements for 
juveniles.178  Many states also have restrictions on where sex 
offenders are permitted to establish residency.179  The statute 
also provides for a civil commitment scheme for those designated 
as sex offenders under the Act.180 
The practical effect of this legislation is instructive in 
analyzing the application of the jurisdictional custody 
requirement to individuals under a sex offender designation 
law.181  The inability to obtain or maintain housing is among the 
 
175 Enniss, supra note 171, at 704 n.68. 
176 See 34 U.S.C.A. § 20920(a); Enniss, supra note 171, at 701–02. 
177 34 U.S.C.A. § 20915(a). 
178 See Editorial Board, Sex Offenders Registry Requires Reboot in Ohio and the 
Nation: Editorial, CLEVELAND.COM, (Nov. 19, 2015) https://www.cleveland.com/opin 
ion/index.ssf/2015/11/sex-offender_registry_requires_reboot_in_ohio_and_the_nation 
_editorial.html. 
179 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-11 (2018), ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-128, -131 
(West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.215 
(West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-15 to -17 (West 2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
8331 (West 2018); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150 / 8 (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 11-13-3-4 (West 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.101, 692A.114 (West 2018); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.2 (2018); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS. ANN. §§ 28.734–28.736 (West 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-35-25 (West 2018); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147 (West 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.16 (West 
2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 1125 (West 2018); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-202-0040 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-535 
(West 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (West 2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
39-211 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.7 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-370.3 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.703 (West 
2018); W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 62-12-26 (West 2018), WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-320 (West 
2018). 
180 Emily Eschenbach Barker, Note, The Adam Walsh Act:  Un-Civil 
Commitment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 145–46 (2009). See generally Stephen 
C. Dries, Sex Predators and Federal Habeas Corpus: Has the Great Writ Gone 
AWOL?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 673 (2006) (discussing the application of the custody 
requirement to sex offenders and civil commitments). 
181 A range of collateral consequences may accompany any criminal conviction. 
Some of these consequences may directly result from the sanction imposed (loss of 
voting rights, loss of ability to possess a firearm, deportation, etc.). See generally 
Velmer S. Burton, Jr. et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A 
National Study of State Statutes, 51 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1987, at 52. Other 
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most serious consequences.  Empirical research suggests that at 
least 44% of individuals subject to a sex offender law reported 
that they were unable to live with family members.182  In 
addition, 57% said that affordable housing was in short supply, 
and 60% reported emotional distress resulting from housing 
restrictions.183  For example, in Indiana, 26% of those surveyed 
indicated that they were unable to return to their homes after 
being released from prison, 37% were unable to live with family; 
and close to one-third reported that a landlord refused to rent to 
them or to renew a lease agreement.184  Many respondents said 
that due to restrictions on where they could live, affordable 
housing was less available, and they were forced to live further 
away from work, social services, and mental health treatment.185 
In addition to the housing difficulties faced by those subject 
to sex offender registration laws, many registered sex offenders 
have lost jobs and have been subject to harassment or property 
damage.186  Policies such as community notification lead to the 
 
collateral consequences, however, are social in nature (stigma, ostracism, financial, 
etc.). See Mary Dodge & Mark R. Pogrebin, Collateral Costs of Imprisonment for 
Women: Complications of Reintegration, 81 PRISON J. 42, 42–43 (2001). However, the 
collateral consequences of a conviction for an individual convicted of a sex-related 
criminal offense are particularly acute in all of these areas. Not only are a number of 
the collateral consequences written into the sex offender registration statutes, but 
the stigma of such a conviction is directed more specifically, by the public, at 
defendants with such convictions. 
182 Jill S. Levenson & Andrea L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 
Unintended Consequences and Community Reentry, 9 JUST. RES. & POL’Y, no. 1, 
2007, at 59, 63. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 64–65. 
185 Id. at 66. The available data confirms reports that residence restrictions 
greatly diminish housing availability. For example, researchers found, through the 
use of geographical information system mapping technology, in one Florida county 
that nearly 23% of the 137,944 properties zoned for residential use were located 
within 1,000 feet of schools and nearly 64% fell within 2,500 feet, reducing the 
number of available residences to 106,888 and 50,108, respectively. See Paul A. 
Zandbergen & Timothy C. Hart, Reducing Housing Options for Convicted Sex 
Offenders: Investigating the Impact of Residency Restriction Laws Using GIS, 8 
JUST. RES. & POL’Y, no. 2, 2006, at 1, 18. When controlled for multiple types of 
restrictions often employed in legislation (schools, parks, daycare centers, and bus 
stops), the number of dwellings available for sex offenders was reduced to 4,233 
within 1,000-feet buffer zones and thirty-seven within 2,500-feet buffer zones. Id. 
186 Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender 
Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 56 (2005); Richard Tewksbury, 
Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Registration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 
67, 76 (2005). 
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loss of social relationships and the isolation of individuals.187  
Researchers have noted that the laws appear to create obstacles 
for reintegration, which may ultimately undermine goals related 
to public protection.188  Beyond the significant tangible 
consequences of registration and notification, the laws carry a 
litany of other intangible consequences, with effects arguably 
more restrictive on liberty than those just discussed.  These 
consequences are no less restrictive on a registrant’s liberty 
interests.  Sex offender registration requirements “raise the 
likelihood—indeed, seek to ensure—that their subjects will be 
expelled from everyday society.  In contrast to being permitted to 
live anonymously with their ex-offender status, registrants are 
publicly and affirmatively singled out by the government as ‘sex 
offenders,’ a distinctly odious label in contemporary America.”189  
As a result, beyond the severe and tangible outcomes resulting 
from vigilantism and harassment, offenders experience 
banishment from their customary social, physical, and economic 
worlds for life.190  According to Chief Judge Edward Becker of the 
Third Circuit, 
 
 
187 See Richard Tewksbury, Experiences and Attitudes of Registered Female Sex 
Offenders, 68 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2004, at 30, 30–33 (discussing the negative 
collateral consequences of sex offender registration including social stigmatization, 
economic losses, and daily living challenges). Community notification includes 
inclusion of offenders in a public database and direct mailings to individuals living 
in the neighborhood. 
188 See Jill S. Levenson et al., Megan’s Law and Its Impact on Community Re-
Entry for Sex Offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 587, 593–99 (2007) (discussing the 
negative collateral consequences of community notification policies, and 
recommending policy changes that better inform the public about sex offenders 
while minimizing the obstacles that interfere with community reintegration). 
189 Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
147, 190 (2000). Arguments have been made to address this issue by citation to 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003). See, e.g., Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 23, 
Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 17–3395). However, 
reliance on this case is mistaken. In Smith, the Supreme Court examined sex 
offender registration requirements of Megan’s Law as enacted in Alaska and 
determined that the statute was not punitive, but civil in nature and therefore did 
not violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 538 U.S. at 105–06. However, 
in a later case, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that a similar statute at issue 
was punitive. See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011). 
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion when reviewing an 
offender registration scheme in Michigan. See Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th 
Cir. 2016). 
190 See Snyder, 834 F.3d at 698 (discussing the effects of the Michigan sex 
offender registration statute on registrants). 
778 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:755   
[T]he burden imposed by the collective weight of all these effects 
is borne by the offender in all aspects of his life.  At worst, the 
offender is literally cut off from any interaction with the wider 
community.  He is unable to find work or a home, cannot 
socialize, and is subject to violence or at least the constant 
threat of violence . . . .  Although perhaps some people will hire 
him or rent him a home, his social intercourse with others is all 
but non-existent.  The effects of notification permeate his entire 
existence.191 
Litigants have argued that Ohio’s sex offender registration “laws 
impose a de facto (if not de jure) banishment, a restraint 
manifestly not ‘shared by the public generally.’ ”192  For example, 
in Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, the petitioner argued that exclusion 
from society was more than a speculative or imagined harm.193  
There, the petitioner was “banned from the school premises 
which her daughter attend[ed]” and barred from attendance at 
all school functions.194  She argued that interference with 
parental duties was a restraint on liberty because it prevented 
her from performing her parental duties.195 
Despite these substantial infringements and restraints, 
courts have rejected the claims that the burden of sex offender 
laws amounts to custody.  Courts have dismissed these 
restrictions as merely “collateral consequences,”196 as a “serious 
nuisance,”197 as “remedial as opposed to punitive,”198 and as 
designed to protect the public.  Courts have analogized the 
restrictions to the loss of voting rights,199 of a medical license,200 
and of a driver’s license.201 
 
191 E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
192 Logan, supra note 189, at 194 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 
240 (1963)). 
193 See Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 189, at 11–12. 
194 Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 20. 
195 Id. at 27. 
196 Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999). 
197 Hautzenroder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2018). 
198 See Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2002). But see Doe v. 
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that Michigan sex offender 
registration laws were punitive and therefore violated the ex post facto clause of the 
Constitution). 
199 See Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987). 
200 See id. 
201 See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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V. THE CASE FOR CUSTODY 
A. Circuit Court Precedent 
In adjudicating the question regarding whether a sex 
offender is in custody, courts generally cite to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jones v. Cunningham and discuss restraints 
on liberty.202  Although courts have reached the same results—
that sex offender status does not qualify as custody—the 
reasoning has been inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.  
The Supreme Court has indicated in explicit terms that access to 
habeas corpus is not to be restricted to “narrow,” “formalistic,” or 
“static” interpretation.203  The habeas statute does not limit that 
relief may be granted to those in physical custody.  As the 
Carafas v. LaVallee Court noted, the statute is “broad with 
respect to the relief that may be granted.”204  “It provides that 
‘[t]he court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice 
require.’ ”205  Specifically, the Court has interpreted custody to 
mean significant restraints on liberty of the type not shared by 
the public.206  Despite the Supreme Court’s historically generous 
approach to habeas access, lower courts have failed to discuss 
this precedent in reaching their conclusions regarding custody 
and sex offenders.207  While focusing on the concept of liberty, 
lower courts have engaged in an ever-shifting discussion on 
whether sex offender laws are punitive or remedial and whether 
the restrictions imposed on sex offenders are collateral 
consequences or part of the criminal sentence.208  As will be 
discussed below, this analysis creates an inconsistent and 
unrealistic body of law. 
One issue that has permeated the analysis of custody as 
applied to sex offenders, is courts’ reliance on precedent, which 
involved examination of sex offender statutes that were not 
reflective of those analyzed in the new case.  Often courts’ 
conclusions belie the text of the statute at issue and the very real 
 
202 See, e.g., Leslie, 296 F.3d at 523; Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183. 
203 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
204 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968). 
205 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012)). 
206 Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. 
207 See supra Part III. 
208 See, e.g., Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (10th Cir. 2016); 
Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014); Leslie v. 
Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 522–23 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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liberty interests infringed by the sex offender restrictions.209  
Courts generally cite to a series of cases across the circuits that 
have declined to expand the definition of custody to individuals 
under a sex offender registration law.210  The issue with this 
analysis is that the statutory schemes at issue across the states 
vary markedly in their restrictions and requirements.  For 
example, in Wilson v. Flaherty, the Fourth Circuit referenced a 
unanimous body of precedent on the issue of custody as applied 
to sex offenders.211  In Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, the Sixth Circuit 
stated that “no court of appeals has held otherwise.”212   
For another example, the Wisconsin statute in Virsnieks v. 
Smith, on which the Wilson court relied, placed only “minimal 
restrictions” on liberty through a requirement of location updates 
that could be accomplished by mail and telephone.213  Based on 
prior case law, the court concluded that the laws at issue did not 
impose significant restraints, physical or otherwise.214  The 
Washington state sex offender law, discussed in both Williamson 
v. Gregoire and in Wilson, does not require the petitioner to 
personally appear at a sheriff’s office to register because 
registration can be accomplished by mail.215  The court in 
Williamson specifically noted that the sex offender “law neither 
targets [the offenders’] movement in order to impose special 
requirements, nor does it demand his physical presence at any 
time or place.  Furthermore, the law does not specify any place in 
Washington or anywhere else where [the offenders] may not 
 
209 See Tina D. Santos, Note, Williamson v. Gregoire: How Much Is Enough? The 
Custody Requirement in the Context of Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Statutes, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 457, 477–79 (1999). 
210 See Bonser v. Dist. Att’y Monroe Cty., 659 F. App’x 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Dickey, 664 F. App’x at 693–94; Calhoun, 745 F.3d at 1073–74; Wilson v. Flaherty, 
689 F.3d 332, 336, 338 (4th Cir. 2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 713–14 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Leslie, 296 F.3d at 522; Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 
2001); McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Williamson 
v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 1998). 
211 Wilson, 689 F.3d at 337. 
212 Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2018). But see Piasecki 
v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 16-4175, 2019 WL 960003, at *7–9 (3rd Cir. Feb. 27, 
2019) (finding that the sex offender requirements could support habeas corpus 
jurisdiction because such requirements constituted “custody”).       
213 Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719–20; see also Wilson, 689 F.3d at 337–38. Likewise, 
in McNab v. Kok, the Ninth Circuit found that Oregon’s law does not place the 
petitioner in custody because the law does not place restraint on physical liberty. See 
170 F.3d at 1247. 
214 Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719–20. 
215 Wilson, 689 F.3d at 338; Williamson, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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go.”216  Washington’s sex offender law is particularly troubling 
because it is so drastically different from more recent sex 
offender registration laws;217 however, courts continue to cite to 
and rely upon it.218  In assessing these cases, it seems that if 
specific restrictions lacking in Williamson were present in other 
state statutes, then those conditions would qualify as custody.  
All of these restrictions were present in the Ohio statute under 
review in Hautzenroeder.219  There, the petitioner needed to 
personally appear before the sheriff to register every ninety days; 
could not  establish her residence within 1,000 feet of a school, 
day care, or preschool; and could not leave the jurisdiction for 
more than three days without registering in the county to which 
she traveled;220 however, courts have failed to extend the custody 
analysis to petitioners subject to those restrictions and 
requirements.  For example, in McNab v. Kok, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed a statute from Oregon and rested upon prior 
conclusions that the laws at issue did not impose significant 
restraints, physical or otherwise.221  In contrast, the Washington 
sex offender law did not require offenders to personally appear at 
a sheriff’s office to register because registration could be 
accomplished by mail.222 
The requirements at issue in Calhoun v. Attorney General of 
Colorado were much less restrictive than those discussed in 
Wilson or cited to in Hautzenroeder.223  The requirements at issue 
in Calhoun, under Colorado law, required a person convicted of a 
qualifying sex offense to perform the following: (1) “appear 
annually in person before the local sheriff to be photographed 
and fingerprinted;” (2) “provide [a] physical address, place of 
employment, vehicle information, and e-mail and other internet 
identifiers;” and (3) “reregister within five days of any change.”224  
 
216 151 F.3d at 1184. 
217 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.034, 2950.04, 2950.07 (West 2018). 
The Ohio sex offender law contains all of the restrictions referenced in Williamson. 
See 151 F.3d at 1183–84.  
218 See, e.g., Wilson, 689 F.3d at 337–38. 
219 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 17–18; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2950.034, 2950.04, 2950.07. Similar laws have been enacted elsewhere. See also 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-903, -906 to -907 (West 2018); Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334. 
220 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.  
221 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also, Williamson, 151 
F.3d at 1184. 
222 Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184. 
223 745 F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (10th Cir. 2014). 
224 Id. at 1073. 
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Furthermore, the sheriff must verify any changes in a qualified 
convicted sex offender’s information.225  The Colorado statute 
contained no residency restrictions or annual verification, unlike 
Ohio’s required verification every ninety days—in two 
jurisdictions for the petitioner in Hautzenroeder—as well as wide 
public dissemination requirements.226 
The statute at issue in Oklahoma more closely resembles the 
statute in Ohio.  In reviewing Oklahoma’s sex offender statute in 
the context of the custody requirement, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that registrants were “free to live, work, travel, 
associate, and engage in lawful activities without government 
approval.”227  This finding is curious given the scope of the 
requirements in the Oklahoma registration statute.228  In 
Oklahoma, sex offenders are banned from living within 2,000 feet 
of a school, “educational institution,” campsite used for children, 
park, or child care facility.229  Registrants are also banned from 
living in the same house together.230  Those subject to these 
requirements are prohibited from loitering within 500 feet of a 
school, child care center, playground, or park.231  Offenders are 
required to register depending on how they have been 
categorized.232  This registration requirement could be as often as 
every ninety days for life.233  Registrants must apprise the sheriff, 
in person, within three days of establishing a new residence, 
changing jobs, or enrolling in school.234  The breadth of the 
information registrants are required to disclose is expansive—as 
are the dissemination protocols.235  Further, in Oklahoma certain 
 
225 Id.  
226 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.06(B)(3) (West 2018). 
227 Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693 (10th Cir. 2016). Although the 
Tenth Circuit’s discussion does not discuss the details of the statute at length, the 
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge does focus on the law. Dickey 
v. Patton, No. Civ-15-685- ˗M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *2 3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2015) 
(report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 
2015). The court appears to read a restriction on travel requirement into the custody 
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is neither in the habeas statute, nor in 
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at *3. 
228 See generally  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1125 (West 2018); id. tit. 57, 
§§ 581–590.2. 
229 Id. § 590. 
230 Id. § 590.1(A). 
231 Id. tit. 21, § 1125(A)(1). 
232 Id. tit. 57, § 583(C)–(D). 
233 Id. §§ 583(C), 584(5)(c). 
234 Id. § 583(F). 
235 Id. 
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classes of offenders are required to obtain a special driver’s 
license identification card that is branded with the words “sex 
offender.”236  Failure to comply with the statutory residency 
requirements results in a felony charge carrying one to three 
years in prison.237  A court’s finding that registrants are free to 
work, travel, and engage in lawful activities without government 
approval is contradicted by the requirements of the Oklahoma 
registration statute. 
As discussed above, many registrants are not free to live 
where they choose and are restricted as to where and how they 
can go about the other normal functions in their lives.  The Third 
Circuit analyzed the Pennsylvania statute in Bonser v. District 
Attorney Monroe County.238  There, the court focused solely on the 
duty to register.239  None of the other liberty restrictions 
discussed above were present in that case.  All of these cases, 
routinely cited by courts, are distinguishable on the face of the 
statutes. 
In denying sex offender petitioners access to habeas review, 
the circuit courts have cited to each other in reaching their 
uniform determination that courts lack jurisdiction; however, 
references to the realities of sex offender registration obligations 
and restrictions call into question the courts’ conclusions.  Sex 
offender laws differ across the states:  Many states impose 
restrictions and requirements that significantly restrain an 
individual’s liberty.  Also, courts have failed to acknowledge the 
social science research regarding the impact of sex offender 
restrictions.  Reference to the actual requirements of the 
particular statute at issue and an authentic evaluation of the 
practicalities of the requirements are necessary in order to 
achieve the justice envisioned by constitutional guarantees to 
habeas corpus. 
B. Collateral Consequences 
In addition to the courts’ failure to consider the statutory 
distinctions in the cases relied upon, the legal analysis around 
the issue is a moving target.  For example, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the Washington state statute was “regulatory and not 
 
236 Id. tit. 47, § 6-111(E). 
237 Id. tit. 57, § 590(D). 
238 659 F. App’x 126, 127 (3d Cir. 2016). 
239 Id. at 128–30. 
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punitive,” signaling that this was a relevant consideration.240  
The Tenth Circuit declared that Oklahoma’s statute was “not a 
continuation of punishment.”241  In Leslie v. Randle, the Sixth 
Circuit focused on the fact that the sex offender law at issue was 
not punitive, but remedial.242  In denying the petitioner’s right to 
habeas because the petitioner was not in custody, the court held 
that the sex offender statute was a form of civil regulation.243  To 
make this determination, the court relied on the interpretation of 
the Ohio Supreme Court that the statute was remedial rather 
than punitive.244  Subsequently, the Ohio Supreme Court 
reversed State v. Cook after the legislature enacted a new, more 
restrictive, sex offender registration and requirement statute.245  
In State v. Williams, the court found that the sex offender law in 
Ohio was punitive.246  While the Sixth Circuit acknowledged this 
change in Hautzenroeder, it declined to change its position on the 
issue of custody.247  Instead, the court in Hautzenroeder found the 
petitioner’s appeal did not “hinge on the punitive nature of the 
statute.”248  Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination 
of punitiveness was irrelevant because the issue in Williams was 
whether the sex offender statute violated the ex post facto 
clause.249   
At other times, courts have determined that the sex offender 
statute at issue was a collateral consequence of the conviction.250  
Historically, Supreme Court precedent allowed that legal 
consequences, which arose outside of the conviction, satisfied the 
custody requirement;251 however, the Maleng v. Cook Court 
 
240 Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
241 Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 694 (10th Cir. 2016). 
242 296 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2002). 
243 Id. at 523. 
244 Id. at 522–23; see State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998) (holding 
that the Ohio sexual-predator statute "serves the solely remedial purpose of 
protecting the public" and that "there is no clear proof that [the statute] is punitive 
in its effect."). 
245 See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112–13 (Ohio 2011). 
246 Id. at 1112. 
247 Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737,744 (6th Cir. 2018). 
248 Id.; see also Kerri L. Arnone, Note, Megan’s Law and Habeas Corpus Review: 
Lifetime Duty with No Possibility of Relief, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 166–77 (2000) 
(discussing the Court’s changing standards for custody determinations). 
249 Hautzenroeder, 887 F.3d at 744. 
250 Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 718 (7th Cir. 2008). 
251 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1954); St. Pierre v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943) (per curiam) (holding that requiring a person 
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departed from this interpretation and determined certain 
consequences of a conviction to be collateral, namely those that 
are not part of a criminal conviction.252  Consequences such as the 
loss of voting rights and the loss of the right to serve on a jury, 
among others, do not satisfy the custody requirements of 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.253  The Supreme Court explored this issue in 
Maleng, finding that once a sentence has completely expired, the 
collateral consequences of the conviction do not give rise to 
custody.254  Collateral consequences are considered civil in 
nature255 and have been defined as those that arise by operation 
of law, and are thus outside the purview of the sentencing 
court.256  Further, a person given an “unconditional discharge” is 
no longer in custody.257  Also, a petitioner is not in custody simply 
because of the potential that the prior conviction may be used to 
enhance sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes of which 
he is convicted.258  This is true because such “a habeas petitioner 
suffers no present restraint from a conviction.”259  In contrast, a 
 
to testify before the grand jury or be committed if he refuses satisfies the custody 
requirement). 
252 See 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam); see also El-Nobani v. United 
States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A collateral consequence is one that 
‘remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in which the 
conviction was entered.’ ” (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st 
Cir. 2000))). 
253 El-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421; Lillios v. New Hampshire, 788 F.2d 60, 61 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (concerning the denial of a driver's license); see also 
Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (addressing the loss of a 
professional license); Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95, 96–97 (7th Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam); Ginsberg v. Abrams, 702 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Harvey v. 
South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Edmunds v. Won Bae 
Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing economic loss that resulted from a 
conviction); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624–25 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
254 Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. The breadth of collateral consequences to which 
criminal defendants can be subjected is broad, including permanent changes in legal 
status, disenfranchisement, registration, community notification, ineligibility to 
work or live in certain places, loss of professional licenses, and loss of child custody. 
Professor Gabriel J. Chin has referred to these consequences as civil death. Gabriel 
J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012). Given the rise in collateral consequences since 
Maleng, it may be time to re-examine the Court’s position that collateral 
consequences in general are an insufficient restraint on liberty to satisfy the custody 
requirement. 
255 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 254 (1980). 
256 See El-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421. 
257 See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491–92 (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 
237–38 (1968)). 
258 Id. at 492. 
259 Id. 
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person like the parolee in Jones, whose release from physical 
confinement under the sentence in question is not unconditional 
and who faces ongoing restraints, may seek habeas relief.260 
In making a determination that the sex offender designation 
was a collateral consequence, neither the Fourth Circuit nor the 
Sixth Circuit addressed the fact that the sex offender 
requirements were part of the criminal sentence.261  Both the 
Virginia statute and the Ohio statute required the sex offender 
designation be imposed as part of the sentencing entry as a 
condition precedent to the imposition of the obligation.262  
Similarly, a recent Tenth Circuit case found that the sex offender 
designation was a collateral consequence without discussion of, 
or application to, the statute at issue in the case.263  But the 
application of the collateral consequence doctrine to sex offender 
registrants is not appropriate in all cases.  In many states, sex 
offender restraints and restrictions are part of the sentencing 
entry and remain in the purview of the sentencing court.  The 
restrictions are not mere nuisances and cannot be analogized to 
the loss of voting rights or the right to serve on a jury.  A court’s 
reliance on the collateral consequence analysis is no longer 
suitable for many of these statutes. 
C. Restraints on Liberty 
Although the Supreme Court has described certain 
consequences of a conviction as collateral, it has not held that 
nonphysical restraints are irrelevant to the custody 
determination. Substantial, but nonphysical, restraints on liberty 
are relevant.  The Carafas Court found that when a conviction 
leaves a habeas petitioner in a position where “[h]e is suffering, 
and will continue to suffer, serious disabilities,” such a person is 
entitled to habeas consideration on the merits.264  The Carafas 
Court went on to say that “[t]here is no need in the statute, the 
Constitution, or sound jurisprudence for denying to [the] 
 
260 See id. at 491 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)). 
261 Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741–42 (6th Cir. 2018); Wilson v. 
Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2012). 
262 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.19(B)(3)(a) (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-
903(B) (West 2018). 
263 See Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (10th Cir. 2016); see also 
Dickey v. Patton, No. CIV-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 
28, 2015) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla. 
Dec. 10, 2015). 
264 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968). 
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petitioner his ultimate day in court.”265  Or, put another way, the 
Great Writ “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, 
formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand 
purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their 
right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liaberty 
[sic].”266 
Courts have recognized that while an individual’s custody 
may begin when he is sent to prison, it extends beyond those 
confines.  Where the state actively supervises a person’s 
movements even though he is not physically restrained, “[h]e 
cannot come and go as he pleases.”267  The thrust of the decision 
in Jones is that the restrictions imposed on the petitioner 
“significantly restrain [the] petitioner’s liberty to do those things 
which in this country free men are entitled to do.”268  The courts 
have affirmatively determined that persons released on their own 
personal recognizance pending trial are in custody.  While a 
“parolee is generally subject to greater restrictions on his liberty 
of movement than a person released on bail or his own 
recognizance,”269 petitioners in the latter category nonetheless 
remain in custody because their freedom “rests in the hands of 
state judicial officers.”270  In Jones and Hensley v. Municipal 
Court, the imposition on the petitioner’s free movement was 
magnified by the state’s active oversight regime, including the 
threat of future imprisonment.271  In both cases, the petitioners 
were subject to rearrest for failure to appear as required.272  
 
265 Id. 
266 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
267 Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). 
268 Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. In applying this understanding, the Court followed 
the common law tradition that recognized liberty restraints to encompass both 
physical imprisonment and substantial oversight by the state or a private party. 
MATTHEW BACON WITH HENRY GWYLLIM & CHARLES EDWARD DODD, 4 A NEW 
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 563 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1876). The 
British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 provided that “any Sheriffe or Sheriffes Goaler 
Minister or other Person whatsoever for any person in his or their Custody” could be 
required to bring a “[p]artie soe committed or restrained” before a magistrate to 
review the legality of his custody. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.). 
Habeas corpus thus has been used by a husband to win the release of his wife from 
the supervision of her guardians, by a father seeking the release of his underage son 
from the supervision of the military, and by guardians seeking the return of 
wrongfully taken children. BACON ET AL., supra, at 570 (quoting United States v. 
Anderson, 24 F. Cas 813 (C. C. D. Tenn. 1812) (No. 14, 449)). 
269 Hensley, 411 U.S. at 348. 
270 Id. at 351. 
271 Id.; Jones, 371 U.S. at 241–43. 
272 See Hensley, 411 U.S. at 348; Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. 
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Similarly, many sex offender registrants are subject to rearrest 
and face potential prison time for failing to comply with the sex 
offender registration requirements.273  A unanimous Court in 
Jones focused the inquiry on whether the petitioner faced 
restraints on liberty “because of his conviction and sentence, 
which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon the 
public generally.”274  In determining whether restrictions 
associated with parole satisfy the custody requirement, the Court 
considered both physical and nonphysical restrictions: 
restrictions on travel; permission to drive a car; “periodical[] 
report[s]” to a parole officer; and the “admonish[ment] to keep 
good company and good hours, work regularly, keep away from 
undesirable places, and live a clean, honest, and temperate 
life.”275  The Court also emphasized the threat of criminal 
consequences for non-compliance.276 
Although the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
determined that probation, parole, and release on bond awaiting 
trial all satisfy the requirements of the habeas statute, many of 
the sex offender registration schemes enacted by state statute 
impose a more significant restraint on liberty; indeed, the Sixth 
Circuit examined a substantially similar registration scheme in 
the state of Michigan and made significant findings.277  
Specifically, that Court found that the sex offender registration 
law at issue resembled the “punishment of parole/probation.”278  
The Sixth Circuit relied on a previous Supreme Court case that 
seriously considered the claim that an Alaska statute resembled 
parole/probation although that statute involved nothing more 
than reporting requirements.279  The Court acknowledged the 
argument had some force, but concluded that it was ultimately 
dissimilar because, unlike parolees, “offenders subject to the 
[Alaska statute] are free to move where they wish and to live and 
work as other citizens, with no supervision.”280  In reviewing a 
 
273 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950(f) (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-
900 (West 2018). 
274 Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 703 (6th Cir. 2016). While this case involved the 
determination that the Michigan sex offender registration statute is punitive and, 
thus, cannot be applied retroactively, it is instructive in analyzing this Court’s 
discussion regarding the statute’s severe restraints on liberty. Id. at 701–03. 
278 Id. at 702–03. 
279 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003). 
280 Id. 
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more recent sex offender law in Michigan, the Sixth Circuit drew 
a contrast to the Alaska law.281  Specifically, the Sixth Circuit 
noted: 
registrants [in Michigan] [were] subject to numerous 
restrictions on where they can live and work and, much like 
parolees, they must report in person, rather than by phone or 
mail.  Failure to comply can be punished by imprisonment, not 
unlike a revocation of parole.  And while the level of individual 
supervision is less than is typical of parole or probation, the 
basic mechanism and effects have a great deal in common.  In 
fact, many of the plaintiffs have averred that [the sex offender 
statute’s] requirements are more intrusive and more difficult to 
comply with than those they faced when on probation.282 
Many states have statutes that reflect the very regulatory 
oversight described.  For example, the Ohio sex offender 
registration scheme restrains a petitioner’s liberty to choose 
where to live.283  A designated sex offender is prohibited from 
establishing a residence or occupying residential premises within 
1,000 feet of school premises, day cares, or preschools.284  This 
limits a petitioner’s freedom of movement in the most 
fundamental way, restricting her habitation to certain segments 
of society.  This restriction is far greater than that imposed on 
probationers or those awaiting trial who are free to decide where 
to establish their residence. 
In most legislative schemes, registration is compulsory and 
violators are subject to substantial prison time for failure to 
register.285  In Ohio, those subject to the law must register in 
person with the sheriff of the county in which they reside, work, 
and go to school every ninety days for life.286  If a petitioner were 
to work in one county, live in another and go to school in a third 
that would require three visits to separate sheriff’s offices every 
ninety days.  As one judge noted, the practical implications of 
this requirement amount to a “continuing, intrusive, and 
humiliating regulation of the person himself.”287  In-person 
 
281 Snyder, 834 F.3d at 703. 
282 Id. 
283 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034(A) (West 2018). 
284 Id. 
285 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-901, -902, -903, -904, 18.2-472.1 (West 2018). 
286 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.11(D)(2) (West 2018). 
287 Doe v. Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring) 
("To require registration of persons not in connection with any particular activity 
asserts a relationship between government and the individual that is in principle 
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reporting requirements dictate that the offender must appear in 
particular places at particular times; this requirement is 
indicative of those requirements imposed on probationers and 
parolees.288  The impact of these restrictions should be discussed 
and acknowledged by the courts analyzing the issue of custody.  
As noted by Professor Logan, a scholar in ciminal law, criminal 
procedure, and sentencing, “[t]he constant necessity to apprise 
law enforcement of one’s whereabouts under threat of 
prosecution represents a unique encumbrance, which chills 
registrants’ freedom of movement, affecting temporary visits to 
other jurisdictions and most certainly permanent moves.”289 
Furthermore, the right to travel is a fundamental right.290  
Under many registration laws, offenders may not leave the 
county for more than three days without registering in person 
with the county where they travel, further restricting their 
freedom of movement.291  “It is inconceivable to think that one 
who must, as his first act, go to local law enforcement and 
announce that he is a felon convicted of a sex offense will not be 
deterred from moving in order to avoid divulging that 
ignominious event.”292  The Supreme Court has recognized that a 
 
quite alien to our traditions, a relationship which when generalized has been the 
hallmark of totalitarian government."). 
288 See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (discussing the 
requirement in the context of a defendant, who was in custody, released on his own 
recognizance pending imposition of a sentence and who was obligated to appear at 
times and places ordered by the court); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242–43 
(1963) (stating that a parolee, who was in custody, “must periodically report” to a 
parole officer). 
289 Logan, supra note 189, at 184–85. 
290 See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417–19 (1981) (describing cases about 
the right, and stating that it is “well settled that the right of a United States citizen 
to travel from one State to another and to take up residence in the State of his 
choice” is constitutionally protected and that the right’s “fundamental nature has 
consistently been recognized”); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 254–55 
(1974) (“The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic 
constitutional freedom.”). 
291 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-
905 (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-302 (West 2018) (within three days). See 
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 2018) (within five days); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
22-108 (West 2018) (within five days). 
292 State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Agid, J., 
dissenting); cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (identifying the 
" ‘right to remove from one place to another according to inclination’ as ‘an attribute 
of personal liberty’ protected by the Constitution." (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 
U.S. 270, 274 (1900))). See generally Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the 
Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification 
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substantial burden on movement might be so severe as to create 
“custody” for habeas purposes, even in the absence of an outright 
prohibition on movement.293  Despite this infringement on 
registrants’ liberty interests, courts have failed to acknowledge 
this reality in assessing the impact of sex offender laws.294   
Parental rights and the parent-child relationship are also 
fundamental liberty interests.295  Many sex offender registration 
schemes contain presence restrictions, which prohibit offenders 
from entering schools, parks, playgrounds, or other locations 
where children are likely to be present.296  While serving to limit 
a registrant’s freedom of movement to areas that free people are 
allowed to visit, these restrictions are also severe restraints on 
fundamental liberty interests individuals have in parenting their 
children.  Even in states where presence restrictions are not 
written into the statute, offenders are banned from certain 
locations by the rules of the organization or institution.297 
 
 
 
Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167 (1999) (discussing generally the similar 
impact of community notification laws). 
293 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (recognizing that a financial 
disincentive to move can implicate the fundamental right to travel). 
294 See, e.g., Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2018) (failing to 
discuss the requirement under Ohio law that registrants must register within three 
days of entering a new jurisdiction). 
295 E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“[F]reedom of personal 
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest . . . .”); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects “the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home[,] and bring up 
children, . . . .”); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 612 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“We have . . . been vigilant in ensuring that government does not 
burden the ability of parent and child to sustain their vital connection” because their 
relationship is fundamental to family life). 
296 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-17 (2018) (prohibiting adult sex offenders 
convicted for sex offenses involving a minor from “loitering” within 500 feet of a 
school, child care facility, playground, park, athletic field or facility, school bus stop, 
college or university, or any child-focused business); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-132 to 
134 (West 2018) (prohibiting certain offenders from knowingly entering swimming 
areas and playgrounds in state parks, local government operated water parks, and 
in certain circumstances, public schools); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 626.81, 3053.8. (West 
2018) (prohibiting registrants from entering schools without permission and 
parolees with convictions involving minors under 14 from entering parks without 
permission); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112 (West 2018) (stating that sex offenders 
may not reside or loiter within 500 feet of school property). 
297 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 20 (arguing that the petitioner was 
banned from the premises of her daughter’s school). 
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In sum, sex offenders often face more substantial restraints 
on liberty than persons on parole or probation, who, since Jones, 
are routinely held to be in custody;298 indeed, even persons with 
more limited and transitory restraints on liberty have been held 
“in custody.”  For example, the Third Circuit found that a person 
sentenced to community service was in custody, notwithstanding 
the following: a lack of continual supervision; a three-year period 
in which to complete the sentence; options as to type and hours of 
service; and no threat of incarceration for non-performance.299  
The Ninth Circuit found that an individual sentenced to fourteen 
hours at an alcohol rehabilitation program, which could be 
scheduled over several days, satisfied the custody requirement 
because it required petitioner’s “physical presence at a particular 
place.”300  Sex offender registration laws limit where offenders 
can live and where they can go, and these laws require their 
presence at the sheriff’s office on a regular basis for life.301  The 
extension of reporting requirements from a fixed period of time to 
a lifetime obligation is one example of how the increasingly 
pervasive and severe restraints on sex offenders go beyond the 
restraints imposed on probationers and parolees for other crimes. 
V. REMEDIES 
Courts’ unwillingness to acknowledge the realities of the sex 
offender requirements creates an untenable condition for 
offenders seeking relief from those restrictions.  The only means 
 
298 See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240–43 (1963). Others have argued 
this position and called upon the courts to reevaluate the application of the custody 
requirement in light of the realities of the actual liberty restraints imposed by sex 
offender registration requirements.  See Kimberley A. Murphy, Note, The Use of 
Federal Writs of Habeas Corpus to Release the Obligation To Report Under State Sex 
Offender Statutes: Are Defendants “in Custody” for Purposes of Habeas Corpus 
Review?, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 513, 517–18, 541 (arguing that sex offenders 
should be able to use federal habeas review to attack sex offender registration 
requirements); Santos, supra note 209, at 459 (arguing that the court erred in 
holding that a petitioner subject to Washington's sex offender registration was not 
"in custody" for habeas purposes). 
299 See, e.g., Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161–62 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
300 Dow v. Circuit Court, 995 F.2d 922, 922–23 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
301 For example, in Ohio the law was amended from a regiment that required 
registration for a specific number of years and/or that allowed offenders to petition 
for release from the requirements to a system that required compliance with the 
restrictions and registration requirements for life. See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 
1108, 1115–17 (Ohio 2011) (O’Donnell, J., dissenting) (discussing revisions to the 
statutory scheme and finding the new statute to be punitive rather than remedial). 
2018] SEX OFFENDERS, CUSTODY AND HABEAS 793 
left available to sex offenders seeking habeas relief to attack the 
conviction is to violate the terms of the sex offender registration 
requirement, which establishes a new conviction and a new 
prison or probation sentence.302  The Ninth Circuit determined 
that a “habeas petitioner is ‘in custody’ for the purposes of 
challenging an earlier, expired rape conviction, when he is 
incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender 
registration law because the earlier rape conviction ‘is a 
necessary predicate’ to the failure to register charge.”303  Not only 
does this undermine judicial economy and finality of convictions 
that the Court has espoused as important considerations, but 
also it violates notions of fundamental fairness.  This is 
especially true in cases like Wilson v. Flaherty where the 
petitioner has demonstrated claims of actual innocence.304  The 
petitioner in Wilson aptly characterized this result as a 
“Kafkaesque regime” where a potentially innocent petitioner is 
only permitted to challenge the burdens of a sex offender statute 
by committing a new crime.305  As the legal analysis is currently 
positioned, this is the only avenue available to individuals under 
a sex offender registration law. 
Courts created a legal fiction to address the issue.306  The 
legal fiction would treat sex offender registration requirements 
as terms of probation and extend habeas review to petitioners.307  
This resolution was offered in the wake of the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Wilson as a way to bring habeas claims of actual 
innocence within the purview of the court and to avoid the unjust 
result in that case.308  While this solution would be feasible, the 
author notes that the Supreme Court has expressly declined to 
allow for the use of legal fiction in the context of habeas 
litigation.309 
 
 
302 See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). 
303 Id. But see Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (holding that 
previous convictions used to enhance a new sentence could not be used to attack a 
federal sentence enhancement where the petitioner was no longer in custody under 
the previous convictions); Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). 
304 Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2012). 
305 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Wilson, 689 F.3d 332 (No. 12-986). 
306 Recent Case, Wilson v. Flaherty, supra note 150, at 2105. 
307 Id. at 2111. 
308 Id. at 2105. 
309 Id. at 2111 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963)). 
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This conundrum could be resolved by action on the part of 
the legislature.  Congressional action could be taken to expand 
the definition of custody and the jurisdictional reach of the 
federal courts.  The revised statute could explicitly include 
certain types of sex offender registration schemes in the 
definition of custody; however, this approach may be as 
inadvisable as it is unlikely.  Given the ever-changing scope and 
reach of sex offender laws and legal consequences of convictions, 
determinations about what precisely satisfies the requirement 
may be properly left in the hands of courts.  Also, considering the 
legislature’s demonstrated desire to limit access to habeas relief 
for state petitioners, coupled with the inability of the legislature 
as it is currently constituted to pass meaningful legislation, this 
resolution appears to be a futile one.310 
The most reasonable solution is that courts acknowledge the 
real restrictions and requirements of many states’ sex offender 
laws.  The current practice of citing to precedent that contains 
legislation, which is materially different from that before the 
court, results in incongruous and unjust results.  Social science 
researchers, legal commentators, practitioners and those 
subjected to these laws have provided data and analysis to 
demonstrate that sex offender designation laws are more than a 
mere nuisance.  Using the framework established by the 
Supreme Court in Jones v. Cunningham, and its progeny, courts 
can and should recognize the very real similarities between 
probation, parole, and sex offender requirements.  The lifetime 
restraints on liberty for the sex offender designee are more 
burdensome than those suffered by individuals required to 
perform community service or to attend alcohol rehabilitation 
classes, and courts should recognize them as such. 
CONCLUSION 
The jurisprudence created by the federal circuit courts has 
failed to keep pace with the constantly changing sex offender 
statutes.  These statutes have consistently evolved in a direction 
that is more punitive, wider in scope, and of a longer duration.  
The majority of the circuit courts’ current application of the 
 
310 See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 10–11, 55–56 (2010) (discussing AEPDA implementation and implications); 
Dina Titus, Is Congress the “Broken Branch” of Government?, 49 POL. SCI. & POL. 
490, 493–94 (2016) (arguing that increasing partisanship prevents congressional 
action generally). 
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custody requirement to sex offender registrants is incompatible 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of custody and ignores 
the reality of the restraints imposed by sex offender legislation.  
The restrictions and obligations imposed on registrants are 
burdensome and have significant restraints on their liberty 
interests.  This condition satisfies the jurisdictional requirement 
of custody, and those laboring under these designations should 
have access to federal review. 
 
